presence of neighbours will expect since it can only detect the resource environment but not the 1 7 3 presence of neighbours. Note that these "game-off" plants can still sense any resource depletion 1 7 4 that is caused by neighbours, however they are incapable of distinguishing between resource 1 7 5 depletion caused by their own roots or the roots of neighbours. Thus, the optimal root production 1 7 6
strategy, u f * , of a plant that cannot detect neighbours should satisfy,
Solving equation (2b) for u f * gives the optimal root production strategy of plant f, and a 1 7 9
version of equation (2b) must be simultaneously solved for plant n. However, though these 1 8 0 game-off plants expect the payoff given in equation (2a), and even though they don't sense the 1 8 1 neighbour, they still must compete with neighbours and their actual payoff is still given by On day zero, multiple seeds were sewn per planting location, and these were thinned to to separate. We had no difficulty carefully separating the roots of each plant grown in 2 5 0 competition by marking the stem of each plant, and gently shaking the root system in water until 2 5 1 they separated. Subsequently, biomass was dried at 60°C to constant mass, and weighed. Fruits were dried at room temperature, counted and weighed. Fruits were then opened and seeds were 2 5 3 counted and weighed. All statistical models were run in the R statistical environment (R- Model results, and best response curves 2 5 8
McNickle and Brown (2012) introduced the concept of a best response curve that plots 2 5 9 one plant's root production strategy, against the root production strategy of its neighbour and we are quite different and this can be a useful diagnostic tool for experimentally comparing game on 2 6 8 or game off plants ( Figure 2 ).
6 9
Based on the model, the root production strategy of the non-game theoretic model presented here follows an ideal free distribution (Fretwell and Lucas 1969, Gersani et al. 1998 lines bow-out from the origin because of the strategy of over-proliferation causes plants to 2 9 0 produce significantly more roots in the presence of neighbours compared to when they grow would predict that, plants grown with one neighbour in pots of volume V should produce 2 9 3 significantly more than half the roots of a plant grown alone in a pot of volume V, and 2 9 4 significantly more roots than plants grown alone in pots of volume V/2. In this study, B. rapa did not engage in a tragedy of the commons game ( Figure 3 ). One way ANOVA revealed that plants grown with neighbours had exactly the same seed yield and Simple game theoretic models that include only root growth and hold all else equal 3 0 8
predict that a plants best response is to always over-proliferate roots in the presence of a However, evidence also shows that other species clearly do not play such games (Figure 3 , ESS would imply that these two strategies should not be capable of coexisting in natural systems. Yet again, the available data seem to suggest that these plants may coexist within the same 2010). This suggests that there is a gap in our theoretical understanding of plant root production 3 2 0 strategies.
2 1
One way of thinking of this gap is that some species (game off plants) may simply not ability. This is the proximate cause of the lack of any game theoretic response, that is, plants simply lack the proximate mechanisms to permit them to play such games. However, this leaves 3 2 5 the ultimate evolutionary cause of this lack of game theoretic responses unanswered: why has 3 2 6 evolution apparently furnished some species with the ability to sense neighbours, but failed to 3 2 7 furnish other species with this ability. This is an especially important question to ask since a 3 2 8
wide variety of models differing greatly in their parameterization, complexity and formulation
have all consistently shown that the game-theoretic response of over-proliferation of roots is the Most current game theoretic models employ the simplifying assumption that competition 3 3 4
belowground is the only important process for plant fitness and this assumption is only met in the 3 3 5 most controlled of glasshouse experiments (E.g. Figure 1 ). Yet, the evolutionary history of plants unknown, and will be an interesting question for plant ecologists interested in strategies for root
The hypothesis of an ideal free distribution also appears to be a common null hypothesis, production of each monoculture. This amounts to an expectation that roots follow an ideal free found that plants in mixture produced significantly more roots than were expected. They called 3 7 9 this over-yielding, but in the context of previous game theoretic ideas it could be called over- (they did not call it an ideal free distribution, and also used the term "over-yielding" for reasons 3 8 4
that are unclear to us). that have argued against game theoretic applications to problems in plant ecology, it is worth 3 9 7
recognizing that behaviours which generate an ideal free distribution of organisms among 3 9 8
habitats can, themselves, be an evolutionarily stable strategy for dispersal derived from a game also consider the distinction between a fixed allocation to roots and plastic allocation to roots.
0 2
The game presented here is one of plasticity, it can be thought of as a behavioural game where Evolutionary time leads to an evolutionary arms race for allocation to resource harvesting organs 4 0 9
and organs associated with competitive ability. For example, such an arms race has produced "game-off" best response curves exactly as shown in Figure 1b over the course of one plant's 4 1 9
life. However, over evolutionary time the expectation would be that plants would gradually 4 2 0 increase total root allocation, causing the linear best response curve to move further and further 4 2 1 from the origin, even while maintaining an ideal free distribution within each generation. Unfortunately, testing this fixed allocation arms race game will be significantly more challenging Evolutionary game theory has injected some controversy into our understanding of the Meler for access to growth facilities, CJ Whelan and P Orlando for discussions on experimental plants will produce more roots in the presence of neighbours compared to alone (potentially 4 6 0 much more than we've shown). For plants that do not engage in a tragedy of the commons game G  r  u  n  t  m  a  n  M  ,  N  o  v  o  p  l  a  n  s  k  y  A  (  2  0  0  4  )  P  h  y  s  i  o  l  o  g  i  c  a  l  l  y  m  e  d  i  a  t  e  d  s  e  l  f  /  n  o  n  -s  e  l  f  d  i  s  c  r  i  m  i  n  a  t  i  o  n  i  n  r  o  o  t  s  .  5  1  8  P  r  o  c  e  e  d  i  n  g  s  o  f  t  h  e  N  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  A  c  a  d  e  m  y  o  f  S  c  i  e  n  c  e  s  o  f  t  h  e  U  n  i  t  e  d  S  t  a  t  e  s  o  f  A  m  e  r  i  c  a  1  0  1  :  3  8  6  3  -5  1  9  3  8  6  7  5  2  0  H  e  r  b  e  n  T  ,  N  o  v  o  p  l  a  n  s  k  y  A  (  2  0  1  0  )  F  i  g  h  t  o  r  f  l  i  g  h  t  :  p  l  a  s  t  i  c  b  e  h  a  v  i  o  r  u  n  d  e  r  s  e  l  f  -g  e  n  e  r  a  t  e  d  h  e  t  e  r  o  g  e  n  e  i  t A 
